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Abstract
Currently, there appears to be a lack of academic research in the area of testing the efficacy of secure
erasure applications and utilities in regard to the activities of an average user in a home or small
business context. This research in progress aims to develop a testing methodology that will provide a
forensically sound base for which to analyse these tools. It involves the installation of various Internet
related applications (for example browsers, instant messaging software and download clients), and the
use of these applications for typical Internet activities (e.g. internet banking, instant messaging, web
browsing and other activities that would be conducted by an average user). Following the creation of the
simulated history, this paper discusses a practical testing methodology that includes the creation of
image files, the allocation of these image files, and the use of forensic tools to examine disk contents
before and after the execution of the secure erasure applications on the simulated user history.
Additionally, a reporting mechanism has been formulated that will allow test results to be efficiently
compiled and compared to form valid conclusions about the effectiveness of each erasure utility on
internet history.
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INTRODUCTION
There are many commercial secure erasure tools available that are targeted towards different user types
and operating systems (C/Net, 2006). There is also limited research into the efficacy of these tools for
erasure of internet and other computer related activity. For example, Jones and Meyler (2004) examined
the effect of selected erasure tools using the Windows NT and Windows 98 operating systems (OS).
The authors concluded that there was sufficient information left to enable a forensic investigator to
determine a trail of activity. These operating systems are no longer supported by Microsoft, and
forensic practitioners now rarely come across computers which use these as their OS’s. Preliminary
analysis suggests that there is little research that has been conducted for the purpose of testing the
security and efficacy of secure erasure applications on the Windows XP Service Pack 2 operating
system.
This paper details a testing and experimentation methodology suitable for this purpose. The final
methodology is designed with forensic validity, integrity and test reproducibility as primary objectives,
and will result in a robust mechanism for testing these utilities under Windows XP SP2. Additionally,
an objective is to produce a testing methodology that can be applied for testing similar tools on
alternative operating systems, or for users with different needs (e.g. business, government, education
and other groups with an interest in preserving confidentiality of records).

Various secure erasure utilities have been evaluated and selected based on consumer popularity and
features offered (Tucows, 2006).

TEST PLATFORM DESIGN
The experimental tests used to determine the effectiveness of the secure erasure utilities are ideally to
be conducted on a set of computers with identical configurations with regard to hardware, software and
storage. The use of identically specified test machines will ensure that experiments and subsequent
findings will be consistent, verifiable and reproducible.

TEST SOFTWARE OVERVIEW
A variety of commercial secure erasure applications and utilities have been selected on the basis of
reported popularity, and similarity of claimed features (Tucows, 2006). These applications will be
installed on separately imaged partitions for testing. These software products vary in price and origin;
however they portray a reasonable and accurate representation of typical erasure tools available to
consumers and organisations. Application version and vendor information are recorded in Table 1.

Table 1.0 Details and Versions of Secure Erasure Applications
Application Name
Version/Build #
Vendor
Anti Tracks
6.9.2
RIGHT Utilities Incorporated
Cyber Scrub Privacy
4.0
Cyber Scrub LLC
Suite
R-Wipe & Clean
6.5 / 1238
R-tools Technology Incorporated
Tracks Eraser Pro
5.7
AceSoft
Window Washer
6.0
Webroot Software Incorporated
Anti Tracks
Anti Tracks is a secure erasure utility produced by RIGHT Utilities Inc.. It is designed to erase a
variety of Internet activity history elements (refer Table X.X), and perform similar functionality on
Microsoft Windows. For added flexibility, the program is upgradeable and updateable with modules
that extend the application’s operations to new software, or software that is not initially included in the
release (RIGHT Utilities, 2006).
Cyber Scrub Privacy Suite
Cyber Scrub Privacy suite is a secure erasure package produced by Cyber Scrub LLC. Cyber Scrub
performs typical secure erasure functions, and its main release is operational on a range of Internet and
Windows applications. Additionally, Cyber Scrub also includes support for removable media, such as
USB memory modules and storage media (CyberScrub LLC, 2006).
R-Wipe & Clean
RWipe & Clean was designed and produced by RTools Technology Inc.. Including functional
capabilities typical of most secure erasure utilities, RWipe & Clean offers some unique features and
functions. For example, RWipe offers users the facility to create customisable wipe lists. This allows
for a more individualised erasure profile, and allows some information that the user may wish to retain
to be kept, whereas other utilities may not differentiate (RTools Technology Inc., 2006).

Tracks Eraser Pro
Tracks Eraser Pro is a software utility produced by AceSoft. Like Anti Tracks, Tracks Eraser Pro is
updateable and upgradeable with additional downloadable modules that extend Tracks Eraser Pro’s
functionality to include programs and applications that were not addressed at the time of initial release.
This also allows the user to reduce the time needed for secure erasure operations to complete as they
can eliminate notinstalled programs from Tracks Eraser’s wipe list (AceSoft, 2006).
Window Washer
Window Washer is a secure erasure utility produced by Webroot Software Inc. Window Washer
includes functionality that is typical for most secure erasure applications, including web browser
history deletion and secure erasure options. Window Washer also includes some Microsoft Windows
extensions that allow the program to integrate with the operating system and provide functions such as
Bleach and Shred (Webroot Software Inc., 2006).

WRITING HISTORY
To simulate an average user’s typical Internet application usage, a variety of programs were installed
and used. These include Web browsers, media applications and peertopeer, download and instant
messaging clients. For full details of the installed software, please refer to Table 2.0.
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Table 3.0 Details and Versions of Installed Software Applications
Application
Purpose
Internet Browsers

Application Name

Version / Build #

Vendor

Internet Explorer

6.0

Firefox
Mozilla
Netscape

1.5.0.4
1.8b
7.2

Opera

9.01 / 8552

Instant Messaging

Limewire
BearShare
BitTorrent
MSN Messenger

4.1.26
6.0.0.23778
4.24.0
7.5 / 7.5.0324

Media Programs

iTunes

7.0.1.8

Quicktime

7.1.3

Microsoft
Corporation
Mozilla
Mozilla
Netscape
Communications
Corporation
Opera Software
ASA
Limewire LLC
Music Lab LLC
Open Source
Microsoft
Corporation
Apple Computer
Incorporated
Apple Computer
Incorporated

P2P / Download
Clients

Once installed, the programs will be used in a manner that will simulate the experience and practices of
an average computer user. These activities shall include:
•

Internet banking – typical Internet banking activities are to be conducted using each of the
Internet browsers installed.

•

Web browsing – installed Web browser software will be used to access a variety of websites
with different content, browser requirements, and authorship demographics.

•

Streaming media – various applications are to be used to stream realtime music and video
media over the Internet.

•

Peertopeer activity – various files will be downloaded from peertopeer network clients to
simulate the average user downloading music, software, images or documents.

•

Instant messaging – the instant messaging client will be configured with a simulation account
and used to communicate with another instant messaging user.

BROWSER HISTORY MANAGEMENT
Browser history is stored and managed differently by each browser (Belani & Jones, 2005). Whereas
some browsers make use of index files to cache Internet files, others use temporary and/or hidden
directories for the storage of transient information.
Microsoft Internet Explorer
Internet Explorer stores browser history under an individual user(s)’ Windows profile. Windows
operating systems (from Windows 2000 onwards) maintain an individual profile for each user,
including their own “My Documents”, “My Pictures” and “My Music” folders, which are hidden from
other nonadministrator users. Included is the location “Temporary Internet Files”, where Internet
Explorer maintains the primary cache(s). A typical file path for this folder could be:
C:/Documents and Settings/[Username]/Temporary Internet Files
Cookies are typically stored in a similar fashion:

C:/Documents and Settings/[Username]/Cookies

History without content is stored in a file named “index.dat.” (Belani & Jones, 2005).
Mozilla, Mozilla Derivatives (Firefox), and Netscape
These browsers (and other web browsers based on them) store history information in a similar fashion
to Internet Explorer (IE). Like IE, these browsers store Internet history in a single file without cached
content, called ‘history.dat’. A significant difference between Internet browsers of this class, and
Internet Explorer, is the technique used to store the cached information. Whereas the index.dat file is
constructed in binary format, the history.dat file is stored as ASCII. This makes it marginally easy to
forensically analyse and extract. A typical storage location for a Firefox Internet history is:
C:/Documents and Settings/[Username]/Application Data/Mozilla/Firefox/Profiles/history.dat.
(Belani & Jones, 2005).

DISK IMAGING PROCEDURES
Prior to any testing or imaging activities, all hard drives and storage devices to be used for experimental
purposes should be securely erased using a forensically sound erasing procedure. This will reduce the
possibility of erroneous or misleading results when further testing and analysis are performed.
Initially, Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 will be installed on the test machine on drive C
(primary hard disk). This will allow the installation of partition management software, and remaining

hard drives and space to be organized into separate partitions suitable for installation and execution of
secure erasure tools.
Drive partitioning will be accomplished by using partition management software (e.g. Partition
Manager, Partition Magic) to divide primary and secondary hard disks into a series of smaller
partitions. There are several reasons for this: secure erasure and image management operations are
significantly less time intensive on smaller disk sizes when compared to using the space available on an
entire hard disk, and it allows the test machine to host redundant Windows images, which are to be
subsequently customized to make them viable for testing purposes.
Additionally, the use of a HELIX Live 1.7 Linux CD and Autopsy 2.06 (sourced prior to version 1.8
release) as a forensic tool will require a partition to be created as an EXT3 system for the forensic
creation of images and extraction of recoverable files.
Programs to be installed to simulate the typical configuration of an average user include various web
browsers (Opera, Microsoft Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla Firefox), peertopeer (P2P) and
download applications (Limewire, Bearshare, BitTorrent) and instant messaging clients (MSN
Messenger), and media applications (Quicktime, iTunes). Some of the erasure tools are able to be
customised in terms of what they erase, but this requires a reasonably high level of technical
knowledge. An assumption is made that someone with such indepth technical knowledge would not be
relying on such erasure software to remove evidence of their activity, so these applications will be
installed in their default mode. They will then be used, and a typical usage history simulated. Activities
to be conducted included Internet banking, videostreaming, file downloads, music streaming, email
access, Internet browsing and other typical uses of Internet applications.
This test installation of Windows XP SP2 (with Internet activity and usage history included) will then
be imaged using the “dd” utility in Helix to become a base platform from which to install and test the
various secure erasure programs. Subsequently, the test images are to be loaded, and a secure erasure
application installed. The resulting installation will then be reimaged via the same procedure, and the
process repeated for each of the secure erasure programs. These images are then to be placed in
separate partitions on the test machine.
A base installation of Windows XP SP2 will be created and installed on the first partition of the
primary hard drive on the test machine. Additionally, “dd” will again be utilised to create a backup
image (to be installed on the secondary drive). This will allow for a clean install of Windows XP SP2
to be duplicated or reinstalled in the event of mistake, error, or equipment failure. In the operational
partition, the installed version of Windows XP Service Pack 2 will be modified to include typical
Internet applications for a variety of purposes.

VERIFICATION OF IMAGE INTEGRITY
Subsequent to installation, the images shall be verified using MD5 and SHA1 hash algorithms. SHA1
was selected as it is the current United States Government standard for cryptographic hash algorithms
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002). Hashing provides an accurate representation of
the data through a mathematical algorithm, and can be used forensically to verify the integrity and
validity of images through comparison and recalculation (Department of Justice/Office of Justice
Programs, 2004). Under Helix, hash calculations can be performed using the “md5sum” and
“sha1sum” commands.
Images will be hashed at a number of points to verify their integrity, and to validate the transfer
methods employed (refer to Image Transfer section) as being able to provide bitwise transfers. Hash
calculations shall be made at various key stages:
•

Postimage file installation – following the formation of the individual image files with their
respective installs of the simulated user history and the secure erasure utility in question.

•

Postexecution – Following the execution of the secure erasure utility and its subsequent
formation of a new image file.

•

Postsever transfer – Subsequent to the transfer of the image files to the ECUIS lab storage
server.

•

Postanalysis machine transfer – Following the transfer of the image files from the server to
the analysis machines.

FORENSIC ANALYSIS
There are a variety of forensic tools available which can be used evaluate the results of secure erasure
utility execution, both proprietary and open source. The primary forensic tool to be employed is
Autopsy, an opensource component of the Helix information security and electronic investigation suite
(Spenneberg, 2003). Autopsy is a browserbased application that enables images to be analysed, and
for specific file types and fragments to be searched for, identified and extracted for further evaluation
(Altheide 2004).
Utilities designed for the gathering of Internet history are also to be employed. These include Web
Historian, a freeware utility that is compatible with a variety of Internet browsers including Internet
Explorer, Opera, Netscape and Mozilla derivatives (Mandiant, 2006). Web Historian functions by
analysing caches and indexes, and exports the analysis results into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet of
identified Internet activity evidence. Preliminary testing using Anti Tracks and Tracks Eraser Pro
validates Web Historian as a forensically sound tool for examination of Internet history – results of the
pre and posterasure analysis by Web Historian showed that the erasure utilities performed as expected,
and as directed. Consequently, Web Historian will be used in all further testing activities.
As a control, posterasure images will also be examined with Windows Explorer to attempt to ascertain
what information is recoverable, and what information (if any) appears to be erased. Analysis using
Windows Explorer also enables the project to better simulate the experience of a user unversed in
digital forensics practices by displaying what they are likely to see when they assume that a file, folder
or combination thereof has been removed.

REPORTING PROCEDURE
A standardised reporting form will be created and utilised in each instance of testing. For each test, key
details are to be recorded including time and date of test, version and installation information of the
secure erasure utility being tested. The reporting mechanism will also include any differences in
hardware or software configurations on the test platforms.
The development of a standing reporting form enables test results to be compiled and recorded under a
uniform structure, and allows tests to be repeated under the same conditions for verification, or
repetition of the intended experiments.

CONCLUSION
This research in progress outlines a methodology for testing the efficacy of commercially available
secure erasure utilities in regards to the context of an average home/small business user. Specifically, a
method for the simulation of such a history has been discussed, including appropriate applications and
activities. Additionally, a testing procedure has been discussed that should allow for valid, reproducible
research and testing to be conducted in this area, with a suitable recording and reporting mechanism as
a component.
Academic research in this field is necessary to produce meaningful and relevant results that can be used
by both users and practitioners. End users can determine whether a particular application will suit their
requirements, and electronic evidence practitioners can use the information for forensic purposes.
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